CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/202
2 November 1967
Original: ENGLISH

NIGERIA

Working Paper containing additions and amendments for inclusion in the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

ARTICLE IIA:

Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear weapon State which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

ARTICLE IVA:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to cooperate directly or through the IAEA, in good faith and according to its technological and/or material resources, with any other State or group of States Party to this Treaty in the development and advancement of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The nuclear weapon States Party to this Treaty shall make available, through the IAEA, to all non-nuclear weapon Parties, full scientific and technological information on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy accruing from research on nuclear explosive devices.

The nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall also provide facilities for scientists from non-nuclear weapon countries Party to the Treaty to collaborate with their scientists working on nuclear explosive devices, in order to narrow the intellectual gap which will be created in that field as a result of restrictions imposed by this Treaty on non-nuclear weapon States.

ARTICLE IVB:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the IAEA, full information on the nature, extent and results of its cooperation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Reports so received by the IAEA shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty.

GE.67-22651
67-27260

ARTICLE IVC:

Each Party to this Treaty shall take necessary legal and administrative steps to ensure that all organisations working on the development of nuclear energy in territory under its jurisdiction do so in conformity with the aims and provisions of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII:

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides:

(a) that the aims of the Treaty are being frustrated;

(b) that the failure by a State or group of States to adhere to the Treaty jeopardizes the existing or potential balance of power in its area, thereby threatening its security;

(c) any other extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of reasons for withdrawal.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/203/Rev.1
22 February 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Suggested Amendment to the third paragraph of Article VIII of the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Article VIII

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.

GE.68-2986
68-05791

ENDC/204
24 November 1967
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

AIDE-MEMOIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND PRESENTED ON 17 NOVEMBER 1967 TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Switzerland is paying the greatest attention to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is convinced that the interest of the community of nations requires that the spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons should be checked. Hence it hopes very much that a satisfactory non-proliferation treaty will be concluded.

The present draft treaty (ENDC/192, 193) cannot yet give rise to the adoption of a definitive position by the Swiss Government, since the text is subject to amendment and one of its main articles is missing. Nevertheless, the draft calls for some comments which it is to be hoped that the negotiators will be able to take into account.

(1) Articles I and II of the draft treaty contain some ideas which should be defined more accurately in order to clarify the commitments which they entail.

(a) The two articles prohibit the direct or indirect transfer of any nuclear explosive device. The Swiss authorities consider that the term "indirect" concerns the supply of arms, explosives or technical assistance for military purposes through the agency of a third State whether a Party to the treaty or not.

(b) The phrase "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" does not cover, according to the interpretation of the Swiss authorities, exploitation of uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water, when these processes are carried out for civil purposes.

The Swiss authorities would like these interpretations to be confirmed formally.

(2) The future article III on control should express in particular the following principles:

(a) Control should be limited to the flow of source and special fissionable materials, as indeed the fifth paragraph of the preamble provides. It should not go beyond its objective, which is to prevent these products from being used for the manufacture of weapons.

Consequently there should be an accurate description of what can be controlled in accordance with the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 3 December 1965.

(b) There should not be any double control.

(c) The costs of control should be borne by the control organ in order to avoid commercial discrimination against peaceful exports of nuclear material from non-nuclear-weapon States for the benefit of nuclear-weapon States not subject to control or of non-signatory non-nuclear-weapon States.

(d) Each State should be entitled to object to particular inspectors, and to have inspectors accompanied during control by its own officials.

(e) To maintain equality in the conditions of competition between States, it would be desirable that control should extend also to the civil nuclear installations of nuclear-weapon States.

(3) Article IV on freedom to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be supplemented:

(a) The sixth paragraph of the preamble expresses the intention of the nuclear-weapon States to make available to all Parties to the treaty the knowledge and benefits of applications of nuclear technology derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices and capable of civil use. This intention should be transformed into a juridical commitment in the body of the treaty, without however implying that the communication of such information would be free of charge.

(b) In regard to atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, the Swiss authorities consider that the intentions expressed in the eighth paragraph of the preamble should also constitute an article of the treaty; this article could provide for the establishment of a special body, in which the non-nuclear-weapon States would be represented, to determine the conditions in which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could take place.

(4) For the treaty to fulfil its aim, it should come near to universality. It would be desirable that article VI, paragraph 3, should stipulate that the entry into force of the treaty shall be subject to ratification by as large a number of States as possible, including all the signatory nuclear-weapon States. Switzerland could only be a party to the treaty if most of the Powers likely to possess nuclear weapons acceded to it. So long as that condition is not fulfilled, the treaty will contain a gap endangering the security of the small States on which it would be binding. Moreover, the non-accession of important industrial Powers might be economically prejudicial to the competitive capacity of the atomic industry of the signatory States.

(5) Article VII stipulates that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration. To subscribe to such a commitment seems hardly conceivable in a field where development is as rapid and unpredictable as that of nuclear science and its technical, economic, political and military implications. Consequently it would be preferable that the treaty should be concluded for a definite period, at the end of which a review conference would decide about its renewal. During that interval the nuclear-weapon States could adopt specific measures aimed at a limitation of armaments. The non-nuclear-weapon States certainly cannot take the responsibility of tying their hands indefinitely if the nuclear-weapon States fail to arrive at positive results in that direction.

(6) The Treaty will establish a lasting juridical discrimination between States according to whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. To consent to this would represent for the non-nuclear-weapon States a heavy sacrifice which is inconceivable unless something is given in return. Since their security is what the arms race chiefly endangers, some progress should be made in limiting this.

The provisions on that subject in the preamble are not sufficient because they do not constitute a commitment but a mere declaration of intent. They should not only be given a place in the body of the treaty but should also comprise more precise obligations, such as the stabilization of atomic armaments at their present level. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States should solemnly and formally undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the treaty.

Such provisions would to some extent meet the security requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(7) It would be desirable that the treaty should provide a mandatory arbitration procedure for all disputes over its interpretation and application.

ENDC/205
30 November 1967
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

I T A L Y

Working Paper

Proposal concerning the transfer of fissile material

(Extract from the speech delivered at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 1 August by H.E. Mr. Amintore Fanfani, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

GE.67-25051
67-28923

"Because of the importance we attribute to a well-balanced and effective treaty, no effort should be spared to make progress with other collateral disarmament measures, especially if they are likely to encourage adherence to the draft treaty.

I therefore wonder whether it would not be possible to imagine some proposal which, while linked up with measures examined in the past, might respond to certain imperatives important for all of us and more particularly for the non-nuclear Powers that have undertaken the negotiation of the treaty. This proposal could be independent of the treaty, linked with or even incorporated in it according to circumstances; it could consist of an agreement under which the nuclear Powers would transmit periodically to the non-nuclear States signatories to the treaty an agreed quantity of the fissile material they produce. Such an agreement would be based on the proposal put forward by the United States in 1964 for a "cut-off" (ENDC/120) -- that is, a discontinuance of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons -- a proposal which was not followed up because of the difficulties encountered in connexion with the question of control. It represented, however, an expression of the will to achieve disarmament, an expression of will to which it might perhaps be opportune to revert today.

An agreement of this kind would indirectly subject the production of nuclear weapons by the militarily-nuclear States to a brake consisting in the necessity of allocating part of their fissile material to non-nuclear countries for peaceful uses.

Within the same context, the non-nuclear countries to which the fissile material transferred by the nuclear Powers would be assigned should pay a reduced price compared to the market value; while part of this price would go to the nuclear producing Powers, the other part could be paid into the United Nations funds for the progress of the developing countries.

The agreement thus proposed could also lay down the principles of the distribution of fissile material among the beneficiary countries. As for control, one could refer to the provisions to be proposed for a non-proliferation treaty.

I wish to stress the link that exists in this proposal between the brake on nuclear armament, the encouragement of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the aid given to the social and economic progress of the developing countries.

This initiative, of which I have sketched the broad outline, would also be a gesture of goodwill by the nuclear Powers in respect of disarmament to prove their willingness to give up part of their fissile material and to put a brake, even a modest one, on the continuous growth of their military nuclear potential. This initiative would provide them with the means of counterbalancing renunciation by the non-nuclear countries by allocating to them fissile material for peaceful uses at a favourable price, which would not fail to encourage concrete measures to fill the technological gap, such as those that were envisaged in an Italian proposal put forward in 1966. The initiative which we suggest would enable the nuclear countries which would give up part of the value, and the non-nuclear countries which would pay the agreed price, to establish an ideal link between disarmament measures and the progress of developing areas, in conformity with the appeal of His Holiness Pope Paul VI and the Italian proposal made in 1965.

Lastly, if the transfer of fissile material would benefit only the non-nuclear countries signatories to the non-proliferation treaty, the idea which I have just explained to you would favour the accession to this treaty of the greatest possible number of non-nuclear countries by providing an appreciable material and moral compensation for their renunciation of nuclear weapons.

If the Committee agrees that this idea is interesting, the Italian delegation could easily develop it for the purposes of the Conference in a document which might prove useful either in the expectation of a draft treaty and even in its preparation or in supplementing and strengthening it."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/206
5 December 1967
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 2 December 1967

I believe history will record that on this day 25 years ago, mankind reached the turning-point of his destiny.

The Book of Genesis tells us that, in the beginning, God directed man to:

"Be fruitful, and multiply, and to replenish the earth, and subdue it ..."

But only in our lifetime have we acquired the ultimate power to fulfill all of that command. Throughout history, man has struggled to find enough power -- and to find enough energy -- to do his work in the world. He domesticated animals, he sold his brother into slavery, and enslaved himself to the machine -- all in a desperate search for energy.

Desperation ended in the experiment conducted in Chicago, 25 years ago, by Enrico Fermi and by his fellow scientists. In a single stroke, they increased man's available energy more than a thousand-fold.

They placed in our hands the power of the universe itself.

Nothing could have been more appropriate than the words that were used by Dr. Arthur Compton to describe what happened on that day:

"The Italian navigator has just landed in the new world."

This modern "Italian navigator" was a great man of science. But he was also something more. He was one of millions who, in the long history of the world, have been compelled to leave a beloved native land to escape the forces of tyranny. Like millions before him, Enrico Fermi found here a new home, among free men, in a new world. His life and career have a special meaning to all who love freedom.

There are today millions of young Americans with an Italian heritage who feel a deep personal pride in Enrico Fermi. America was born out of the voyages of a great Italian navigator. In a time of greatest danger, another -- equally willing to pursue his dream beyond existing charts - took us into a new epoch.

GE.67-25460
67-31808

Today we commemorate our debt to him. And in doing so, we also honor the historic bond between the old world and the new.

In a short time, we will be dedicating, in Illinois, a new national accelerator laboratory. This laboratory, with its 200,000 million electron-volt accelerator, will maintain our country's position in the forefront of nuclear research.

And I suggest that we dedicate this great new laboratory to the memory of the modern-day "Italian navigator".

In so honoring Enrico Fermi, we will also honor the immeasurable contributions made, over the centuries, by the people of Italy to the people of the United States.

Much has already happened in that new world which began 25 years ago.

Giant nuclear reactors, direct descendants of Fermi's first atomic pile, are producing millions of kilowatts of power for peaceful purposes. Other reactors are powering nuclear submarines under the seas of the earth -- our first line of defense against tyranny, whatever its contemporary doctrine or disguise, which Enrico Fermi dedicated himself to resist.

But it is really the peaceful uses of atomic energy about which Enrico Fermi would have wished us to speak -- and they are many.

When I became President, nuclear energy was generating about 1,000,000 kilowatts of electric power in the United States.

Today, the atom is giving us more than 2,800,000 kilowatts -- almost three times as much. And more than 70 additional nuclear power plants are already planned or under construction.

This will equal about 20 per cent of the whole electric generating capacity in the United States today. It is enough to meet the total requirements of 45 million people. All this from what was, 25 years ago -- before the success of Fermi's experiment -- only a scientist's dream.

The dream has been realized. By learning the secret of the atom, we have given mankind -- for the first time in history -- all the energy mankind can possibly use.

It took the genius of countless generations of dedicated scientists to find the secret, and it remains to us to use it wisely.

What began as the most terrible instrument of war that man has even seen, can become the key to a golden age of mankind. But this will not happen unless we make it happen.

We cannot forget that another, darker future also opened on this day, 25 years ago.

The power to achieve the promise of Genesis is also power to fulfill the prophecy of Armageddon. We can either remake life on earth or we can end it forever.

Let me be specific.

If Enrico Fermi's reactor had operated ten thousand years, it would not have produced enough plutonium for one atomic bomb.

Today, a single reactor can, while generating electricity, produce enough plutonium to make dozens of bombs every year. And scores of these reactors are now being built all over the world.

Their purpose is peaceful. Yet the fact remains that the secret diversion of even a small part of the plutonium they create could soon give every nation power to destroy civilization -- if not life on this earth.

We cannot permit this to happen.

Nor can mankind be denied the unlimited benefits of the peaceful atom.

We must find a way to remove the threat while preserving the promise.

The American people made their own desires crystal clear when their representatives in the United States Senate voted unanimously to support an effective nonproliferation treaty for nuclear weapons.

We are now engaged in a major effort to achieve such a treaty, in a form acceptable to all nations.

We are trying to assure that the peaceful benefits of the atom will be shared by all mankind -- without increasing the threat of nuclear destruction.

We do not believe that the safeguards we propose in that treaty will interfere with the peaceful activities of any country.

And I want to make it clear to the world that we in the United States are not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves.

So I am, today, announcing that when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance.

Under this offer the Agency will be able to inspect a broad range of U.S. nuclear activities, both governmental and private, including the fuel in nuclear reactors owned by utilities for generating electricity, and the fabrication and chemical reprocessing of such fuel.

This pledge maintains the consistent policy of the United States since the beginning of the nuclear age.

Just 14 years ago, a President of the United States appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations to urge the peaceful use of the atom. President Eisenhower said on that occasion:

" ...The United States pledges...before the world...its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

We renew that pledge today. We reaffirm our determination to dedicate the miraculous power of the atom, not to death, but to life.

We invite the world's nations to join with us.

Let us use then this historic anniversary to deepen and reaffirm the search for peace.

Let us so conduct ourselves that future generations will look back upon December 2, 1942 -- not as the origin of sorrow and despair -- but as the beginning of the brightest, most inspiring chapter in the long history of man.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/207
5 December 1967
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Statement made by the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right Honourable F. Mulley in the House of Commons on 4 December, 1967

As the House will know, a key issue in the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a Non-proliferation Treaty has been the safeguards to be applied in order to ensure that there is no diversion by the non-nuclear weapon signatories of the Treaty of materials from their civil nuclear programmes to nuclear weapon purposes.

In order to assist these negotiations Her Majesty's Government have decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon states in implementation of the provisions of a Treaty, they will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Her Majesty's Government welcome the similar decision announced by President Johnson on behalf of the United States.

GE.67-25464
67-31810

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/208
7 December 1967
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

INTERIM REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

(recommended by the co-Chairmen)

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission an interim report of the Committee's deliberations on the questions before it for the period 21 February 1967 to 7 December 1967.

2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.

3. Upon the recommendation of the co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 21 February 1967 and have held two sessions. The first session recessed on 23 March 1967. The second session reconvened on 18 May 1967.

4. In view of the approaching adjournment of the Twenty-Second Session of the UN General Assembly and the need for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to remain in session in order to expedite its work on a draft non-proliferation treaty, the Committee has decided to submit this interim status report to the UNGA and the UNDC.

5. Pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly in Resolution 2153A (XXI) the Committee has undertaken intensive consideration of a draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Representatives participating in the work of the Committee have made valuable contributions toward achievement of a treaty which would be in conformity with that resolution. These contributions are contained in the public records of the Committee. The Committee has already made substantial progress, although a final draft has not as yet been achieved. Since the Committee has concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, it reports regarding the "Question of general and complete disarmament," General Assembly Resolution 2162C (XXI), and the "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America," General Assembly Resolution 2165 (XXI), that it

has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of these matters. With respect to the "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests," General Assembly Resolution 2163 (XXI), the Committee reports that it has held a valuable discussion regarding this matter in which several delegations made important contributions.

6. Since the Committee is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is unable at this time to provide a report on this question for the consideration of the UNGA or the UNDC. The Committee intends to submit a full report, including all relevant documents, as soon as possible.

This report is submitted by the co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

A. A. Roshchin

United States of America

William C. Foster

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/209
12 December 1967

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

Statement by the President of the Republic of Chile
Presented on 29 November 1967 to the co-Chairmen of the
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Statement by the President of Chile
31 October 1967

"In view of various publications regarding the situation of Latinamerican armament, the Government of Chile wishes to express its opinion as follows.

Chile neither supports nor sponsors disarmament of the Latinamerican countries.

The military institutions represent a vital element in life of our countries and constitute the warranty of internal and external security, of public order and national sovereignty, and for this reason they must maintain the necessary level of efficiency to fulfil their important task.

Different, however, is to fall into a militaristic career.

Our Government, as well as the former one, supports the necessity to restrict the acquisition of armaments, because otherwise we could precipitate ourselves into a competition, the political, economical and social consequences of which would be of greatest seriousness, since no country, without risking its own security, could exclude itself from that competition.

It is inconceivable that while on one part we are supporting economical integration of our nations as the main objective, on the other part we should initiate a policy of unlimited acquisition of armaments.

This situation would be even more inexplicable if we think that weapons so acquired would have no other sense than to defend ourselves against a possible attack from the same neighbour countries which are at present engaged in the struggle for economical integration. Notwithstanding the high costs of such weapons they would not be of the latest technological standards and in any case suitable in the event of a world war, which moreover in our days would be absolutely out of control for our countries.

GE.67-26143
67-32039

On the other hand, a warlike preparation means an economical and social decision. It is absolutely incompatible for our people to support simultaneously an accelerated effort of economical and social development in order to extirpate misery, bring education to a high level, build housings, improve health conditions, develop agriculture and industry and create full employment and to pay the costs of uncontrolled armament competition.

Furthermore, unanimously and solemnly all American Presidents assembled in Punta del Este support the above mentioned attitude in connexion with the acquisition of armaments. It seems appropriate to reproduce their declaration:

> "The Latinamerican Presidents, well aware of the importance of the armed forces for the maintenance of security, recognize at the same time that the requirements of economical development and social progress make it necessary to apply to that purpose the maximum of the available resources in Latin America".
>
> "Consequently, they express their intention to restrict military expenses in proportion to the real requirements of national security and in accordance with the constitutional dispositions of each country, avoiding such costs which are not indispensable for the fulfilment of the specific tasks of the armed forces and, should this be the case, of international commitments that bound the respective governments".
>
> "As regards the Treaty of Abolishment of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, they express their wish that it will come into force as soon as possible, once the requirements of this Treaty are fulfilled".

This declaration was based on the philosophy inspiring the Alliance for Progress. To act otherwise would mean to destroy its basic grounds and conception.

The Government of Chile, when making this statement, does not pretend to judge nor to refer to resolutions adopted by any of the States within the scope of its sovereignty. It has no reproach nor complaint against any nation of the hemisphere. Chile respects them and seeks their friendship, convinced that only economic integration and co-operation between our countries can open us a wide road of progress, justice and social peace.

We are guided only by the strong wish to seek, considering the reality and necessary outfit of the Armed Forces, agreements enabling us to put into practice the declaration of Punta del Este in order to devote fundamentally our resources to the economical and social development which our people require so urgently.

We do not pretend ourselves to provoke a meeting to consider this problem. We just want to point out to all friendly people and governments in Latin America that our Government is open and well disposed to participate in any high level meeting that should be held or proposed by any country with this purpose.

Not to act immediately would bring along evident dangers. It would mean a deep senselessness between the facts and the declarations and would compel us to esteem valueless the established machinery intended to unite and to assure ourselves peace."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/209/Rev.1
15 December 1967

ENGLISH/FRENCH AND RUSSIAN ONLY

Statement by the President of the Republic of Chile
Presented on 29 November 1967 to the co-Chairmen of the
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Statement by the President of Chile
31 October 1967

"In view of various publications regarding the situation of Latin American armament, the Government of Chile wishes to express its opinion as follows.

Chile neither supports nor sponsors disarmament of the Latin American countries.

Our armed forces are essential to the life of our countries: they safeguard our internal and external security, public order and national sovereignty, and must therefore maintain the level of efficiency necessary for the fulfilment of their important task.

To be drawn into an arms race is, however, quite a different matter.

Our present Government, like its predecessor, maintains that the acquisition of armaments must be restricted, for otherwise we might throw ourselves into a competition which would have the most serious political, economic and social consequences, since no country could refuse to compete without risking its own security.

It is inconceivable that we should make our chief aim the integration of our nations, and at the same time should initiate a policy of unlimited acquisition of armaments.

The situation would be even more unreasonable, for the weapons so acquired would have no other use than to defend each country against attack by the very neighbours who are seeking integration. However much the weapons cost, they could not be of the latest technological standards, nor of any use in a world war, over which moreover in these days our countries would have absolutely no control.

GE.67-26577
68-00018

On the other hand, an arms race imports an economic and social decision. It would be absolutely incompatible for our peoples to redouble their efforts at economic and social development in order to extirpate misery, raise education to a high level, build housing, improve health conditions, develop agriculture and industry and create employment, and simultaneously to pay the costs of an uncontrolled competition in armaments.

Furthermore, all the American Presidents assembled in Punta del Este unanimously and solemnly supported that attitude towards the acquisition of armaments. We think it necessary to reproduce their declaration:

'The Presidents of the Latin-American Republics, conscious of the importance of armed forces to the maintenance of security, recognize at the same time that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to devote to those purposes the maximum resources available in Latin America.

'Therefore, they express their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security in accordance with each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding those expenditures that are not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of the armed forces and, where pertinent, of international commitments that obligate their respective governments.

'With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the hope that it may enter into force as soon as possible, once the requirements established by the Treaty are fulfilled'.

This declaration was based precisely on the philosophy inspiring the Alliance for Progress. To act otherwise would destroy its fundamental meaning.

The Government of Chile, in making this statement, does not claim to judge nor to refer to resolutions adopted by any of the States in the exercise of their sovereignty. It makes no complaint or reproach against any nation of the hemisphere. Chile respects these nations and seeks and needs their friendship, for it is convinced that only inspiration and co-operation between our countries can open before us a wide road of progress, justice and social peace.

We are guided only by an earnest desire, subject to the actual situation and the need to maintain armed forces, to seek agreements which will enable us to put the Declaration of Punta del Este into practice and devote the bulk of our resources to the economic and social development which our people so urgently require.

We do not ourselves claim to convene a meeting to consider this problem. We merely wish to point out to all fraternal peoples and governments in Latin America that our Government is completely ready and willing to participate in any high-level meeting that may be convened or may be proposed by any country, for this purpose.

Failure to act immediately would court obvious dangers. It would mean a deep contradiction between the facts and the declarations, and would compel us to admit that none of the machinery intended to unite us and ensure peace had the least value."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/210
18 January 1968

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1968 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING RESOLUTIONS 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII) 2344 (XXII) AND 2346 (XXII) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I have the honour to transmit the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

A/RES/2289 (XXII) - "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1623rd meeting on 8 December 1967;

A/RES/2342A (XXII) and A/RES/2342B (XXII) - "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;

A/RES/2343 (XXII) - "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;

A/RES/2344 (XXII) - "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967;

A/RES/2346A (XXII) - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967.

I would draw attention particularly to the following direct references to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in the above-mentioned resolutions:

In A/RES/2289 (XXII), operative paragraph 2 referring to the possibility of negotiations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the conclusion of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;

In A/RES/2342A (XXII), operative paragraph 4 recommending that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, should take into account the Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons and the conclusions thereof (A/6858);

GE.68-559
68-02075

In A/RES/2342B (XXII), operative paragraphs 1 and 3 requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with resolution 2162C (XXI) and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2343 (XXII), operative paragraph 4 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2344 (XXII), operative paragraphs 1 and 2 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with resolution 2165 (XXI), and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In A/RES/2346A (XXII), operative paragraphs 2 and 3 calling upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee as well as the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, and requesting the Committee to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations together with pertinent documents and records.

In connexion with paragraph 3 of A/RES/2289 (XXII), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6834; A/6840/Add.1; A/6850/Rev.1; A/6851/Rev.1
A/C.1/L.409; A/C.1/PV.1532, 1534-1537, 1539-1541
A/6945; A/PV.1623

In connexion with paragraph 2 of A/RES/2342B (XXII), the relevant documents and records are the following:

A/6680/Rev.1; A/6840; A/6850/Rev.2; A/6851/Rev.2
A/C.1/L.411; A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1; A/C.1/L.412 and Add. 1-2;
A/C.1/L.415; A/C.1/L.417; A/C.1/L.419 and Add. 1-2
A/C.1/PV.1545-1555; A/7017; A/PV.1640

I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for information of the members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which deal with disarmament matters:

A/RES/2286 (XXII) - "Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America", adopted at the 1620th meeting on 5 December 1967;

A/RES/2346B (XXII) - "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th meeting on 19 December 1967.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant
Secretary-General

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2289 (XXII)
11 December 1967

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 96

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/6945)]

2289 (XXII). Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, contained in resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

Reaffirming its conviction, expressed in resolution 2164 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and give further impetus to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament,

Considering that it is necessary, in view of the present international situation, to make new efforts aimed at expediting the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. Expresses its conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention;

2. Urges all States, in this connexion, to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics[1] and such other proposals as may be made on this question and to

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1/ See A/6834.

/...

undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" to all States Members of the United Nations and to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

1623rd plenary meeting,
8 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2342 (XXII)
4 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 29

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7017)]

2342 (XXII). Question of general and complete disarmament

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons,

Noting that the report has been completed and is available,[1]

Convinced that the wide dissemination of the report would contribute to a better understanding of the threat presented by nuclear weapons and encourage speedy progress in the prevention of their spread, as well as in other measures of nuclear disarmament,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the Secretary-General's report as an authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons and on the implications of their acquisition and further development;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him for the prompt and effective manner in which the report was prepared;

3. Notes the conclusions of the report and expresses the hope that all the parties concerned will consider them carefully;

1/ A/6858.

4. Recommends that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take into account the report and the conclusions thereof in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Office of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

6. Recommends to all Governments the wide distribution of the report and its publication in their respective languages, as appropriate, so as to acquaint public opinion with its contents;

7. Invites regional intergovernmental organizations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and national and international non-governmental organizations to use all the facilities available to them to make the report widely known.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

B

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1/]

Recalling its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962, 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2031 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting that since then the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming its conviction of the necessity to continue to exert new efforts, for the purpose of ensuring tangible progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament,

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1/ A/6951.

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI);

2. Decides to transmit to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee, as well as those of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to this item;

3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2343 (XXII)
4 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 30

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7021)]

2343 (XXII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1]

Recalling its resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965 and 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting with regret the fact that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,[2]

Noting with increasing concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, an exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for national evaluation of seismic events,

Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests,

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1/ A/6951.

2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

Realizing that such a treaty would also constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States which have not done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;

2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

3. Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data;

4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2344 (XXII)
4 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 31

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7022)]

2344 (XXII). Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1]

Recalling its resolution 2165 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not been able to give sufficient consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI);

2. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the progress achieved on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

1/ A/6951.

68-00277

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2346 (XXII)
5 January 1968

Twenty-second session
Agenda item 26

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7016)]

2346 (XXII). Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Having received the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,[1]

Noting the progress that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made towards preparing a draft international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting further that it has not been possible to complete the text of an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that it is imperative to make further efforts to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible date,

Expressing the hope that the remaining differences between all the States concerned can be quickly resolved,

Taking into account the fact that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and intends to submit a full report for the consideration of the General Assembly as soon as possible,

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1/ A/6951.

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966 and 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966;

2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records;

4. Recommends that upon the receipt of that report appropriate consultations should be initiated, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the setting of an early date after 15 March 1968 for the resumption of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly to consider item 28 (a) entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament".

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966, by which it decided that a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States should be convened not later than July 1968,

Having considered with appreciation the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,[1/]

1. Approves the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, subject to paragraph 2 below;

2. Decides to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968;

1/ A/6817.

3. Decides to invite to the Conference non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to make appropriate arrangements for convening the Conference in accordance with the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

ENDC/211
18 January 1968
Original: ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UNITED KINGDOM

Message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee from The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Right Honourable Harold Wilson

With the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the negotiations for the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to which the Committee has devoted so much effort move to their crucial stage. I am glad that agreement has been reached on a complete text to be tabled at the opening of this session and hope that the Treaty will soon be opened for signature.

The early conclusion of this Treaty will not only constitute a major arms control achievement; it should also open the way to further progress in the field of disarmament.

I send the Disarmament Committee my best wishes for a constructive session.

GE.68-578
68-02072

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/212
19 January 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson dated 18 January 1968

I am most heartened to learn the Soviet Union will join the United States, as co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, to submit a complete text of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that this draft treaty will be submitted today to the Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes an agreed safeguards article and other revisions that will make the treaty widely acceptable.

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all governments. Following its review by the conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in the world, the two nations which carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophy of nuclear war can, with sufficient patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek -- a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

I believe history will look on this treaty as a landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future. In that spirit I commend it to all.

GE.68-503
68-02071

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/213
25 January 1968
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement of the United States Atomic Energy Commission dated 25 January 1968 on Project Gasbuggy

The United States Atomic Energy Commission and other project participants released today the preliminary technical data obtained from Project Gasbuggy. Project Gasbuggy is the first joint government-industry experiment in the AEC's Plowshare Program to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

The detonation occurred on December 10, 1967 near Farmington, New Mexico. The limited seismic data analyzed to date indicate that the explosion released approximately 26 kilotons of energy.

The specific objective of Project Gasbuggy is to obtain data to help determine whether nuclear explosives can be used to stimulate production and recovery of natural gas from formations where gas is not presently economically recoverable by conventional means. The experiment is being conducted jointly by the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the Department of the Interior, and the AEC. The technical programme is under the direction of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, operated for the AEC by the University of California. The final results of Project Gasbuggy are not expected to be known for about a year.

GE.68-1527
68-1527

Re-entry drilling was completed on January 10, 1968 and indicates that a chimney of broken rock formed as expected. The top of this chimney is 3,907 feet below the surface of the ground which gives a chimney height of 333 feet. Pre-shot calculations had indicated that a layer of coal, located 334 feet above the explosion point would stop the formation of the chimney at that height. The agreement between calculations and the actual chimney height is considered remarkably good. The fact that the chimney height was so close to that expected gives increased confidence that other pre-shot calculations such as the 78-foot chimney radius may be also approximately correct. Other measurements indicate that the chimney was formed by collapse within a minute after the explosion.

At the time of the explosion the instrumentation designed to measure the extent of fracturing in rock around the chimney indicated that such fractures were formed and extend out to about 440 feet. The pre-shot prediction of the extent of such fracturing was about 390 feet.

The chimney formation and the extent of the fracturing are important since the rate at which natural gas flows into the well is determined by the permeability of the rock and the pressure of the gas within the rock. Thus, the size of the chimney of broken rock and the extent of the fractures extending outward from it, determine the increase in the recoverable gas.

The measurements of gas pressure in the Gasbuggy reservoir prior to detonation revealed a gas pressure of about 1,050 pounds per square inch. The gas pressure, measured after the explosion currently is 833 pounds per square inch at the surface which indicates the pressure in the chimney now to be about 950 pounds per square inch. The lower pressure results from the fact that the explosion created about two million cubic feet of void space between the broken rock in the chimney into which gas can flow. As gas enters the chimney, pressure within the chimney starts to increase and is expected to approach original levels within a few months. One of the objectives of the Gasbuggy experiment is to determine the rate at which gas re-enters the chimney, and this can be measured, in part, by the rate of the pressure increase. This data will be refined further by removing the gas collected in the chimney and again measuring the rate at which gas re-enters the chimney. Such determinations will be part of the continuing post-shot programme.

The predictions made before the Gasbuggy explosion indicated that several radionuclides would be present in the gas after the explosion - including krypton-85, iodine-131, and tritium. Measurements to determine the amount of tritium are important in assessing the public health and safety aspects of this experiment. However, the samples of gas collected and measured to date at the Gasbuggy site have shown only that xenon-133 is present. The presence of xenon is not unexpected, and its short radio-active half-life of about five days means that it would not be of significance in future applications.

On-site instruments used for these radioactivity measurements are designed primarily to assure the health and safety of the workers at the site. They are not designed to perform detailed analyses to identify very small quantities of krypton or tritium. Samples of natural gas have been flown to Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, for detailed analyses, to investigate the presence of these and other nuclides. The results of these analyses are not expected to be known for several months.

Scientists working on this project point out that the most important information to be obtained from the Gasbuggy experiment -- on radioactivity, gas flow increases related to fracturing, gas pressure, and gas production testing -- will be gathered and analyzed during the coming year, after which it will be possible to draw firm conclusions about the results of the experiment.

In the attached figure, the larger drawing at the right shows schematically the chimney, or column of crushed rock, and attendant fracturing, resulting from the use of a nuclear explosive used for the stimulation of gas production. The smaller drawing at the left shows in idealized form how nuclear explosives might be used for actual gas production in a gas bearing field.

GAS RESERVOIR STIMULATION



W.P. = LOCATION OF EXPLOSIVE
R_c = CAVITY RADIUS
r_f = FRACTURE RADIUS
r_d = RADIUS OF DRAINAGE
H = HEIGHT OF CHIMNEY
h = DEPTH OF BURIAL



CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/214
24 January 1968
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Letter dated 24 January 1968 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The Representative of the USSR in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has received a letter from the World Council of Peace, dated 5 December 1967 and accompanied by a message of the World Council of Peace to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I request you to arrange for the aforesaid message of the World Council of Peace to be circulated by the Committee's Secretariat as an official document of the Committee.

(signed) A. ROSHCHIN

Representative of the USSR in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

GE.68-1540
68-05023

Brussels, 5 December 1967

Mr. Alexei A. ROSHCHIN

Leader of the USSR delegation
to the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament

5 Avenue de la Paix

Geneva.

Sir,

We have the honour to transmit to you the message of the World Council of Peace to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This message was adopted by the Executive Committee of the World Council of Peace at its session held at Leningrad from 27 to 29 October 1967.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of our highest consideration.

(signed) L. Ghosh

for

Romesh CHANDRA

General Secretary of
the World Council of Peace

(signed) Isabelle Blume

Co-ordinating Chairman
of the
Executive Committee
of the
World Council of Peace

MESSAGE TO THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE

Since the day of its foundation the World Council of Peace has constantly advocated the prohibition of atomic weapons and general and complete disarmament under international control.

The World Council of Peace notes that the armaments race - the nuclear armaments race in particular - is being continued intensively. Today there is in the world approximately eight million times the equivalent of the bomb which made 100,000 victims at Hiroshima, and it is known that biological and chemical weapons of considerable destructive power are being developed and produced in the most secret manner. Mankind is living more and more on the brink of the final catastrophe.

The World Council of Peace has always followed attentively the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It warmly welcomed the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, but it has to regret today that that Treaty has not been extended to cover underground explosions (although the technical problems of control have been resolved) and that it has not been signed by all Powers. The World Council of Peace calls for both the extension of that Treaty to cover underground tests and its signature by all countries.

The signing of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, by limiting the number of Powers possessing such weapons, would be a step in favour of peace.

It should be accompanied by an undertaking on the part of the nuclear Powers not to use these weapons against non-nuclear Powers. It is obvious that such a treaty should be followed at an early date by the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and by substantial disarmament measures.

It is also obvious that arrangements should be made to enable all nations to benefit from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that there should be no infringement of their independence.

The way would thus be paved for the total prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and for general and complete disarmament.

The World Council of Peace, in transmitting this message to you, is confident that you will heed the voice of millions of people who, in all the nations, wish to see the threats of extermination disappear and science used exclusively in the service of the good of mankind.

Leningrad, 29 October 1967.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/215
8 February 1968
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Working Paper with suggestions in regard to the draft Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, put forward by the Delegation of Sweden at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 February, 1968

Preamble: after the tenth paragraph insert a new paragraph worded as follows:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 in its preamble to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,"

Article VI: insert in the second line after the words "nuclear arms race" the following words: "at an early date," and insert in the third line before the word "disarmament" the word "nuclear".

The article would then read as follows:

"Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Article VIII: add to the present wording of paragraph 3 the following sentence:

"At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty."

GE.68-2188
68-05123

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/216
13 February 1968
Original: ENGLISH

SWEDEN

Working Paper with further suggestions in regard to the draft Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, put forward by the Delegation of Sweden at the meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 February 1968.

Preamble: in the seventh paragraph, second and third lines delete the words "by nuclear-weapon States".

Article V: delete in the third and sixth lines the words "non-nuclear-weapon",

delete in the seventh line the words "so desiring" and "or agreements" and

delete in the eighth line the words "on a bilateral basis or".

The Article would then read as follows:

"Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to other States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that States Party to this Treaty may, pursuant to a special agreement, obtain any such benefits through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States."

GE.68-2526
68-05120

ENDC/217
13 February 1968
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Aide-memoire from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America, dated 10 February 1968

On 21 January 1968 a B-52 bomber of the United States Strategic Air Command carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed in the area of North Star Bay off the western coast of Greenland while trying to land at the United States Air Force base at Thule.

As a result of the disaster the bombs fragmented and radio-active substances leaked out of them. The search party of the United States Air-Force that arrived at the place of the accident has stated that radio-activity consisting of alpha particles emitted by plutonium has been discovered in the vicinity of Thule. According to a dispatch of Associated Press, the leader of the search party, Major General Richard O. Hunziker, has stated that, apparently, it will take months before the United States Air Force succeeds in recovering the lost bombs, and that the search party has not even determined the scale of the problem facing it.

Competent scientists in various countries consider that the risk of radio-active contamination off the shores of Greenland is a very serious one. The extensive fisheries areas of the Atlantic Ocean will suffer from radio-active contamination for many months and possibly years. This hazard will be even further increased when radio-active particles are caught up by currents and carried throughout the waters of the Atlantic. The Gulf Stream, which washes the shores of many States, is directly in the area of radio-activity.

The operations of the United States Air Force, which have led, not for the first time, to radio-active contamination of wide areas of the sea, are a violation of the generally recognized principles and standards of international law. They are contrary to the purpose of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This purpose is to "put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". These operations also infringe the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, to which the United States is a party. This Convention obliges each State to take measures to prevent "pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radio-active materials or other harmful agents".

In attempting to minimize the seriousness of the disaster, the United States Defense Department has stated that the hydrogen bombs did not explode because they had a safety device. Of course, this explanation in no way alters the fact of the dangerous leakage of radio-active substances from the hydrogen bombs, which occurred in the present case, as in many previous similar cases. Attempts to represent as normal a situation in which United States nuclear bombs fall to the ground year after year, even though they have a safety device, cannot be taken seriously.

Is there any guarantee that the next accident to a United States bomber armed with nuclear bombs will not lead to the explosion of the bombs, with all the ensuing consequences? According to a statement in the Western press, there has already been an incident in which, at the time of an accident to a United States B-52 bomber in January 1961, four of the five switches were brought into operation, and everything depended solely on the last switch, which, had it been actuated, would have caused the hydrogen bomb to explode.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Thule, each of the four hydrogen bombs carried by the B-52 bomber was of 1.1 megatons. The explosion of even one of these bombs would be 50 times greater than the power of the explosion that wiped Hiroshima off the face of the earth. Such a catastrophe is possible not only over Greenland, but also over densely populated areas of the earth, since the United States Air Force, as is known, makes flights over many countries of the world. Who can guarantee that in the present, tense enough situation, such a nuclear explosion would not entail a whole chain of irreversible events, hazardous for the whole of mankind?

It is therefore quite understandable that many Governments, including Governments of the military allies of the United States, are protesting against flights of American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in their air space. Two years ago, when United States nuclear bombs fell on Spanish soil in the Palomares area, a number of Governments protested against such flights and demanded their cessation. Justifiable anxiety is now being expressed by the Government of Denmark, which has stated that flights over Greenland of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are a violation of existing agreements.

The Soviet Government, for its part, has more than once warned the Government of the United States of the serious risk that is represented by flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons outside national boundaries. Attention was drawn to this in the aide-memoire from the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States of 16 February 1966 in connexion with the incident on the Spanish coast, when a

considerable area of land and water was contaminated by radio-activity following a similar air disaster. Nevertheless, as is evidenced, in particular, by the new disaster to a United States B-52 bomber off the shores of Greenland, the United States Government has not drawn the appropriate conclusions.

The Soviet Government once again draws the attention of the United States Government to the dangerous and even aggressive nature of flights by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons, especially in the neighbourhood of the boundaries of the Soviet Union. From a purely military standpoint these flights by United States bombers are pointless under the circumstances of the existence of nuclear missile weapons. They can have only one purpose: to increase international tension, without regard to the consequences for the security of the peoples and the fate of mankind. It is obvious that the responsibility for such a way of acting rests wholly and entirely on the Government of the United States.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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I T A L Y

Working Paper containing additions and amendments to articles IV, VIII and X of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Article IV: insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 1:

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to acquire source and special fissionable materials or equipment for the use of source and special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes.

Article VIII: amend paragraph 3 to read as follows:

3. Every five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

Article X: amend paragraph 2 to read as follows:

2. The Treaty shall have a duration of 25 years. It shall be renewed automatically for periods equal to its initial duration for all governments which shall not have given, six months before the date of its expiry, notice of their intention to withdraw.

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